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The Federal Circuit’s Summary Affirmance Habit
The Federal Circuit is certainly unique among the circuit courts of
appeals. Its exclusive jurisdiction over patents places it in a powerful
position. But with that power comes a responsibility to oversee the
development of the law. And in the last decade, the court has fallen short
of fulfilling this obligation—particularly with regard to clarifying
provisions of the America Invents Act.
The court has repeatedly disregarded important questions of law by
use of Rule 36 summary affirmance. Though other courts of appeals
regularly use summary disposition as a means of dealing with burgeoning
dockets, the Federal Circuit uses summary affirmance at a much higher
rate and to dismiss unresolved legal questions.
This Comment explores some of the possible reasons why the court
uses summary affirmance so frequently. After discussing summary disposition more generally, it specifically presents the theory of certproofing—or avoiding Supreme Court review—as one possible
explanation. It concludes by offering some solutions to curb the court’s
summary affirmance habit.
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To say the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit (“Federal Circuit”) is unique among appellate courts is an
understatement. Whereas other federal courts of appeals are
limited by region and function as courts of general jurisdiction, the
Federal Circuit’s docket is governed primarily by subject matter.1
Although the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction encompasses adjudicatory authority in such areas as government contracts and labor
disputes, it was primarily founded to oversee the development of
patent law.2
In the 1970s, the Carter administration recognized that confusion in patent law was crippling the country’s economic growth.3
Inconsistency among the regional circuits revealed the need for
uniformity and consistency.4 The solution to these problems was
the creation of a national court with exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over patent appeals.
Yet since its creation in 1982, the Federal Circuit has been a
source of controversy, with lawyers, academics, and judges criticizing the court’s alleged inconsistencies.5 Many of these criticisms are

1. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2012).
2. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts,

64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (1989).
3. Pauline Newman, The Federal Circuit in Perspective, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 821, 822 (2005).
4. Id. at 823.
5. See, e.g., Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2111, 2117
(2014) (sharply criticizing the Federal Circuit’s decision-making); Paul R. Gugliuzza, Saving
the Federal Circuit, 13 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 350, 352 (2014); Laura G. Pedraza-Fariña,
Understanding the Federal Circuit: An Expert Community Approach, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 89,
89 (2015); Ashby Jones, Critics Fault Court’s Grip on Appeals for Patents, WALL STREET J. (July 6,
2014, 7:10 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/critics-fault-courts-grip-on-appeals-for-patents
-1404688219.
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related to the development of patent doctrine and the decisionmaking of individual judges.6 Little has been written concerning the
court’s procedural habits. Among the court’s interesting procedural behaviors is its regular use of Rule 36 summary affirmance,
or affirmance of the lower court without an opinion.7 While academics have considered the court’s summary affirmance rate from
a statistical viewpoint,8 the reasons for and practical implications of
this practice have garnered much less attention.9
In this Comment, I analyze the Federal Circuit’s Rule 36 practice
and plausible explanations for the court’s proportionally high use
of summary affirmance. The court may very well be using summary affirmance properly in response to a growing and complex
caseload. But based on a review of summarily affirmed cases, this
seems unlikely. Rather, it appears that the Federal Circuit is using
Rule 36 improperly and, consequently, hindering the development
of patent law.10 Although summary affirmance is a necessary tool
the Federal Circuit should arguably employ to handle its case
load,11 I argue the court should avoid shying away from unresolved
questions and instead look to other solutions that would have lessdamaging effects on development of the law.
This Comment proceeds in five parts. In Part I, I provide background on the progression of patent law over the last half-century

6. See, e.g., Ted L. Field, Hyperactive Judges: An Empirical Study of Judge-Dependent
“Judicial Hyperactivity” in the Federal Circuit, 38 VT. L. REV. 625 (2014).
7. See FED. CIR. R. 36.
8. E.g., Beth Zeitlin Shaw, Please Ignore This Case: An Empirical Study of Nonprecedential Opinions in the Federal Circuit, 12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1013 (2004).
9. Two articles—recently made public—consider the legality of the Federal Circuit
issuing an opinion in Patent and Trademark Office appeals. Dennis Crouch, Wrongly Affirmed
Without Opinion, 52 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 561 (2017); Matthew J. Dowd, An Examination of the
Federal Circuit’s Use of Rule 36 Summary Affirmances (Feb. 25, 2017) (unpublished manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2920306. Beyond these two articles,
neither of which makes all the observations made herein, very little has been said about the
Federal Circuit’s summary affirmance habit.
10. I am not alone in this critique. See, e.g., Crouch, supra note 9; Matthew Bultman,
Fed. Cir. Issuing More ‘Hidden Decisions’ amid Case Influx, LAW360 (Mar. 1, 2017, 12:06 PM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/894024/fed-circ-issuing-more-hidden-decisions-amid
-case-influx; Peter Harter & Gene Quinn, Rule 36: Unprecedented Abuse at the Federal Circuit,
IPWATCHDOG (Jan. 12, 2017), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/01/12/rule-36-abuse
-federal-circuit/id=76971/.
11. But see Crouch, supra note 9 (arguing that the Federal Circuit is statutorily required to issue opinions in certain appeals).
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and point out questions left unanswered by recent statutory reform.
Although I focus on questions created by the America Invents Act,
the discussion that follows is applicable to all legal questions
presented before the Federal Circuit. In Part II, I discuss summary
disposition generally and detail the primary benefits and drawbacks of the Federal Circuit’s use of Rule 36. Specific cases are
explored as a means of revealing the potentially damaging effects
of summary affirmance. In Part III, I explore plausible explanations
for why summary affirmance is being used at such a high rate.
Some alternative means of controlling the court’s docket are
considered in Part IV. Part V concludes.
I. BACKGROUND
The creation of the Federal Circuit came after a decade of heated
debate. An overburdened judiciary and a need for greater uniformity in certain areas of federal law prompted discussion of
creating a new federal court of appeals.12 Yet there were concerns
that a specialized court would become subject to tunnel vision,
produce less than thorough opinions, and be at risk of capture by
interest groups.13 Ultimately, Congress decided to merge the
United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and the
appellate division of the United States Court of Claims to create a
court with specialized subject matter jurisdiction, including
jurisdiction over all patent appeals from the district courts.14
Congress hoped that endowing the court with exclusive
jurisdiction over patent appeals would bring about uniformity in
the law.15 According to the former Chief Judge Howard T. Markey,
prior to the creation of the Federal Circuit, the field of patent law
was “glaringly chaotic.”16 However, the mere creation of a new
court did not achieve the result of clarifying the law. Patent
12. Charles Adams, The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: More than a National
Patent Court, 49 MO. L. REV. 43, 44–46 (1984) (discussing the formation of the Federal Circuit).
13. Marion T. Bennett, The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit—Origins,
in THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT: A HISTORY 1982–1990, at
28–30 (1991).
14. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982).
15. Lee Petherbridge, Patent Law Uniformity?, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 421, 422–23 (2009).
16. HOWARD T. MARKEY, THE FIRST TWO THOUSAND DAYS: REPORT OF THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 1982–1988, at 3 (1988).
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secrecy17 was rampant, resulting in a system that “operated nontransparently, with great subjectivity, and with distressing unpredictability.”18 The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 and the Uruguay Round
Agreements Act of 1994 brought much-needed reform to the patent
system but failed to free the system from “non-transparency, subjectivity, unpredictability, and excessive complexity.”19 Congressional efforts to overhaul the U.S. patent system began with the
Patent Reform Act of 2005, but such efforts were met with industry
group opposition and repeatedly failed.20 In 2011, contention between Congress and industry groups finally transformed into legal
change in the form of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA).
A. The America Invents Act
The AIA is the most comprehensive piece of patent legislation
in the last sixty years.21 It attempts to reduce uncertainty in the
patent system and “increas[e] opportunities for third-party
involvement both pre- and post-issuance” of a patent.22 To this end,
the AIA changes from a first-to-file to a first-to-invent system,
creates new post-grant methods of challenging a patent, and
establishes a new Patent Trial and Appeals Board (PTAB) to handle
post-grant reviews and inter partes reviews.23 A thorough review of
the AIA can and has occupied hundreds of pages of academic
writing. Here, I limit my review of the AIA to a surface-level look
at new post-grant proceedings and the creation of the PTAB to
highlight questions of law left unanswered by the AIA’s plain
meaning. The analysis that follows this background discussion is
not limited to the AIA; I have simply chosen to analyze the AIA
because it presents easy-to-find, unresolved questions.
17. That is information only known to the inventor or, at the very least, information
unavailable to the general public.
18. Robert A. Armitage, Understanding the America Invents Act and Its Implications for
Patenting, 40 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 8 (2012).
19. See id. at 9.
20. Hung H. Bui, An Overview of Patent Reform Act of 2011: Navigating the Leahy-Smith
America Invents Act Including Effective Dates for Patent Reform, 93 J. P AT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
SOC’Y 441, 443 (2011).
21. Id. at 445.
22. Michael Dixon, The Sweeping Changes of the 2011 America Invents Act, 18 WESTLAW
J. INTELL. PROP. 2, at *1 (2012).
23. Bui, supra note 20 (providing a comprehensive overview of the AIA).
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1. Post-grant proceedings
The AIA introduced three new types of post-grant procedures:
inter partes review (IPR),24 covered business method (CBM) patent
review,25 and post-grant review (PGR).26 Each of these procedures
is conducted before the newly created PTAB, providing third
parties opportunities to challenge the validity of issued patents.
a. Post-grant review. A PGR is a PTAB trial proceeding during
which a third party challenges the validity of a patent on the basis
of any condition required for patentability.27 A PGR must be
initiated within nine months after the patent in question is granted
or reissued.28 The PTAB may institute a PGR if the petition
“demonstrate[s] that it is more likely than not that at least one of
the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.”29 The PTAB
may also institute a PGR upon “a showing that the petition raises a
novel or unsettled legal question that is important to other patents
or patent applications.”30
b. Covered business method patent review. A CBM patent is a patent
“that claims a method or corresponding apparatus for performing
data processing or other operations used in the practice, administration, or management of a financial product or service, except
that the term does not include patents for technological inventions.”31 CBM reviews are tried before the PTAB and governed by
PGR procedures and general trial practice procedures explained in
regulations.32 Only a party sued or charged with patent infringement of a CBM patent may petition for CBM review.33 And CBM
review is only available nine months after the grant of the patent.34
In order for the PTAB to begin a CBM patent review, (1) it must be
more likely than not that the petitioner could prevail on at least one
24. 35 U.S.C. § 311 (2015).
25. Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284, 329–31 (2011);

37 C.F.R. §§ 42.300–.304 (2012).
26. 35 U.S.C. § 321 (2015).
27. Id. § 321(a)–(b).
28. Id. § 321(c).
29. 37 C.F.R. § 42.208 (2016).
30. Id.
31. 37 C.F.R. § 42.301 (2012).
32. Id. § 42.300.
33. Id. § 42.302(a).
34. Id. § 42.403.
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claim or (2) the petitioner must raise a novel or unsettled legal
question important to other patents.35 Although the CBM review
does not allow for the review of all patents, it can be a powerful tool
for accused infringers for a few reasons: (1) unlike an IPR, a CBM
allows validity challenges on any ground that is a condition for
patentability,36 and (2) an accused infringer may file a petition for
CBM review any time PGR is unavailable.37
c. Inter partes review. The IPR is another trial proceeding during
which the validity of a patent is challenged using only prior art or
printed publications with the petitioner requesting to cancel at least
one claim as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103.38 Anyone
other than the patent owner may file a petition.39 The petition must
be filed at the later of (1) nine months after the grant of the patent
or (2) the close of any post-grant review.40 The patent owner, in
response to an IPR petition, may file a preliminary response “limited to setting forth the reasons why no inter partes review should be
instituted.”41 The PTAB may grant IPR of a patent if there is a
reasonable likelihood that the petitioner could prevail on at least
one claim.42
2. Creation of the PTAB
The PTAB replaced the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, the main judicial body of the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO). One of the primary reasons for creating
an administrative body to adjudicate the three, new post-grant
proceedings rather than relying on traditional Article III courts was
to drive down litigation costs. The American Intellectual Property
Law Association estimated that in low-stake patent lawsuits (in
which less than $1 million is sought), litigation costs rose from
$650,000 in 2005 to $700,000 in 2013.43 For high-stakes litigation
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

35 U.S.C. § 324(a)–(b) (2012).
37 C.F.R. § 42.304(b)(2).
Id. § 42.303.
35 U.S.C. § 311(b) (2012).
Id. § 311(a).
Id. § 311(c).
37 C.F.R. § 42.107(a).
Id. § 42.108(c).
AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 34 (2013).
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during the same period, costs rose from $4.5 million to
$5.5 million.44 Expedited procedures before an administrative body
will ideally curb those figures. The PTAB also has the potential to
reduce error costs.45 Whereas Article III judges are often generalists,
administrative patent judges are required to be competent in
matters of science and the law,46 allowing them to efficiently handle
patent issues generally considered to be highly complex.
Since its creation, the PTAB has been heavily used. In 2012, the
USPTO published a regulation estimating the number of PGR,
CBM review, and IPR petitions it expected the PTAB to handle.47
Comparing these estimates to the actual number of petitions filed
between 2013 and 2015, the PTAB experienced a 148% overage in
petitions.48 Clearly, the new post-grant procedures created by the
AIA are being utilized, and these additional opportunities for
litigation have created an abundance of new legal issues.
3. Legal questions created by new post-grant proceedings
Though the AIA clarified some aspects of the patent system, it
also ushered in a myriad of new legal questions. I have chosen to
review only a select number of those questions, not necessarily
because of their ultimate importance in the patent law scheme, but
because the Federal Circuit, through summary disposition, has
seemingly ignored, or at least unduly delayed, answering them.
Specifically, I consider new issues related to motions to amend,
waiver, and secondary considerations.
During an IPR or PGR, the patent owner may file a motion to
amend a patent, cancelling a challenged claim or proposing a reasonable number of substitute claims.49 The IPR regulations promulgated under the AIA provide minimal guidelines with respect to
motions to amend, leaving many questions unanswered; for

44. Id.
45. Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Administrative Power in the Era of Patent Stare

Decisis, 65 DUKE L.J. 1563, 1567 (2016).
46. 35 U.S.C. § 6(a) (2012).
47. Rules of Practice for Trials Before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board and Judicial
Review of Patent Trial and Appeal Board Decisions, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,612, 48,651 (Aug. 14, 2012).
48. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD STATISTICS 2 (2016). In total, between September 16, 2012, and July 31, 2016, the PTAB received
5359 petitions. Id.
49. 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.121(a), 42.221(a).
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example, the regulations do not say who bears the burden of proof
regarding patentability of amended claims and what the specific
requirements are for successfully amending claims.
The AIA is silent with respect to whether arguments not raised
before the PTAB are waived on appeal. Although it is likely that the
Federal Circuit will deem arguments not raised before the PTAB
waived, it is unclear whether arguments made in an IPR preliminary response but not repeated after the PTAB’s institution decision
are considered waived on appeal.
The non-obviousness requirement is “the ultimate threshold for
patentability.”50 Although obviousness is often proved by considering the scope and content of the prior art and differences between
the prior art and the claims at issue, patent law allows for the use
of secondary considerations to prove non-obviousness.51 Secondary
considerations are the “economic and motivational . . . issues” that
“might be utilized to give light to the circumstances surrounding
the origin of the subject matter sought to be patented.”52 The
Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit have determined that in
general patent disputes, secondary considerations can be given
significant weight as they “may often be the most probative and
cogent evidence in the record.”53 The question of what weight to
give secondary considerations resurfaced with the creation of new
post-grant proceedings and remains unanswered.
Each of the aforementioned issues has passed before the Federal
Circuit. But rather than resolve these new issues on first appearance, the court used a method of summary disposition, allowing
ambiguity and confusion to persist. Before exploring the specific
cases in support of this claim, it is helpful to understand the
development of summary disposition as a regular practice of
the court.

50. Natalie A. Thomas, Secondary Considerations in Nonobviousness Analysis: The Use of
Objective Indicia Following KSR v. Teleflex, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2070, 2074 (2011).
51. Id. at 2075.
52. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966).
53. Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
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II. SUMMARY DISPOSITION
From June 30, 2015, to June 30, 2016, 60,099 cases were filed in
the United States Courts of Appeals.54 Between 1971 and 2005, the
courts of appeals experienced nearly a 500% increase in filings.55
Although the Federal Circuit’s caseload has not experienced this
type of growth, it has experienced both an increase in the total
number of filings (particularly since implementation of the AIA56)
and an “increase in the difficulty of the average case.”57 Given the
number of cases pending before appellate courts, procedural remedies have been created to quickly dismiss frivolous suits and insignificant cases. The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure (Federal
Rules) describe a number of these procedures. However, one method of disposition, summary disposition, or judgment without an
opinion, is not explicitly contemplated by the Federal Rules. That
said, the Federal Rules give appellate courts broad discretion to
apply expedited procedures as necessary.58 Perhaps relying on this
broad discretion, many courts have created specific provisions in
their local rules describing the procedures for summary disposition.59 The Federal Circuit has such a rule.60

54. U.S. Court of Appeals—Judicial Caseload Profile, U.S. CTS. (2016), http://www.
uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/fcms_na_appprofile0630.2016.pdf.
55. Cathy Catterson, Changes in Appellate Caseload and Its Processing, 48 ARIZ. L. REV.
287, 287 (2006).
56. Jon E. Wright & Pauline M. Pelletier, Don’t Let Your Patent Appeal Get Lost in the
Crowd, NAT. L.J. (Jan. 25, 2016, 12:00 AM), https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/alm
ID/1202747725537/ (noting that between 2013 and 2015, the number of appeals coming from
the Patent Office increased from less than 150 to more than 400).
57. Paul R. Michel, The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit Must Evolve to Meet the
Challenges Ahead, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 1177, 1181 (1999).
58. See FED. R. APP. P. 2.
59. E.g., 9TH CIR. R. 3-6; 3D CIR. R. 27.4.
60. FED. CIR. R. 36.
The court may enter a judgment of affirmance without opinion, citing this rule,
when it determines that any of the following conditions exist and an opinion would
have no precedential value:
(a) the judgment, decision, or order of the trial court appealed from is based on
findings that are not clearly erroneous;
(b) the evidence supporting the jury’s verdict is sufficient;
(c) the record supports summary judgment, directed verdict, or judgment on
the pleadings;
(d) the decision of an administrative agency warrants affirmance under the
standard of review in the statute authorizing the petition for review; or
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Federal Circuit Rule 36 governs when the court may enter a
judgment of affirmance without an opinion, requiring that certain
conditions be met, including a determination that an opinion
would have no precedential value and unanimity.61 The former
Chief Judge Markey of the Federal Circuit explained that summary
affirmance is appropriate when “it’s not necessary to explain, even
to the loser, why he lost.”62 Explaining this principle in different
terms, summary affirmance is appropriate “when the position of
one party is so clearly correct as a matter of law that no substantial
question regarding the outcome of the appeal exists.”63
In recent years, the rate of summary disposition in the federal
courts of appeals has increased. In 2012, the federal courts of
appeals decided approximately 35,000 cases on the merits.64 Of
those cases, about 5000 were summarily disposed.65 When a court
chooses to summarily dispose of a case, it announces its judgment
without providing written reasoning or analysis. Such judgments
lack precedential value.66
The creation of the PTAB resulted in a dramatic increase in the
number of cases being appealed to the Federal Circuit, and the
number of appeals coming from the district courts has held
steady.67 The result is an overburdened Federal Circuit seemingly
forced to find new ways to deal with its saturated docket. The
Federal Circuit appears to have turned to Rule 36 as a means of
easing its burden. On appeals coming from the USPTO in 2010, the
Federal Circuit utilized Rule 36 thirty-seven percent of the time.68
In 2015, the Federal Circuit employed Rule 36 fifty-eight percent of
(e) a judgment or decision has been entered without an error of law.
Id. (emphasis added).
61. Id.; INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURES FED. CIR . NO. 10.5.
62. The Seventh Annual Judicial Conference of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, 128 F.R.D. 409, 420 (1989).
63. Joshua v. United States, 17 F.3d 378, 380 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
64. Colter Paulson, The Trend Toward the Use of Summary Dispositions, SIXTH CIRCUIT
APPELLATE BLOG (May 14, 2013), http://www.sixthcircuitappellateblog.com/news-and-analysis
/the-trend-toward-the-use-of-summary-dispositions/.
65. Id.
66. See Rates Tech., Inc. v. Mediatrix Telecom, Inc., 688 F.3d 742, 750 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(citing U.S. Surgical Corp. v. Ethicon, Inc., 103 F.3d 1554, 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
67. See Jason Rantanen, Data on Federal Circuit Appeals and Decisions, PATENTLYO
(June 2, 2016), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2016/06/circuit-appeals-decisions.html.
68. Id.
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the time.69 Since the creation of PTAB proceedings, the Federal
Circuit has decided 113 PTAB appeals, sixty-one of which were
disposed of by a Rule 36 affirmance.70
While an initial statistical glance suggests that the Federal
Circuit may be ignoring the letter of the law and using Rule 36 to
“rubber stamp” PTAB decisions, a strong argument can be made
that the statistics are bloated. Between December 2013 and November 2015, the Federal Circuit issued forty-two decisions stemming
from IPR appeals.71 Of these decisions, twenty-one, or fifty percent,
were summary affirmances.72 However, this statistic does not take
into consideration the number of appeals awaiting a decision. As of
November 2015, fourteen appeals had been argued and sufficient
time had lapsed to all but rule out the possibility of a Rule 36
summary affirmance.73 Taking these appeals into consideration, the
actual number of IPR appeals summarily disposed drops to thirtyseven percent. Comparing this figure to the summary affirmance
rate in 2010, the recent use of Rule 36 seems reasonable from a
statistical standpoint.
However, even if the aforementioned statistical argument is
persuasive, the Federal Circuit often uses summary affirmance
inappropriately.74 Rule 36 summary affirmance should be used
only when any of five conditions are met and an opinion would
have no precedential value.75 As I will demonstrate in section II.B,
the Federal Circuit has passed over opportunities to issue

69. Id.
70. Elliot C. Cook, Daniel F. Klodowski & David C. Seastrunk, Federal Circuit PTAB

Appeal Statistics: September 2016, FINNEGAN (Sept. 12, 2016), http://www.aiablog.com/ptab
-stats/federal-circuit-ptab-appeal-statistics-september-2016/.
71. Justin A. Hendrix & Jacob A. Schroeder, Surfs Up: Is the Federal Circuit Using Rule
36 to Rubber-Stamp the PTAB’s Decisions in IPRs?, LEXOLOGY: FEDERAL CIRCUIT IP BLOG
(Nov. 16, 2015), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=b86d0f48-659f-42ac-a00a
-d31451e84767.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. When I speak of the Federal Circuit generally, I do not mean to impugn the court’s
integrity or dedication to the law. I speak of the judge who, on occasion at most, either reads
Rule 36 loosely or pays less attention to the strict letter of the law.
75. FED. CIR. R. 36.
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precedential opinions that could resolve issues generated by the
creation of the AIA’s post-grant review proceedings.76
A. Purpose of Summary Affirmance
The primary benefit of summary affirmance is the preservation
of court resources and time. In 2013, the Federal Circuit handled
1381 appeals.77 In 2016, that number rose to 1839.78 The court’s
resources have not matched this growth.79 Consequently, the court
needs a tool to dispose of frivolous claims or cases presenting
settled questions of law. Rule 36, with its discretion-limiting language restraining judges, can be an effective means of controlling
the court’s docket and resources without hurting development of
the law.
Although courts should not operate like machines at the cost of
equity or fairness, efficiency is an important aim of the court
system.80 Summary affirmance is a valuable tool for promoting
efficiency, and when courts abide by summary affirmance
guidelines, the aims of equity and efficiency can be simultaneously
met. While more could be written about the value of summary
affirmance, I focus on the primary drawbacks of improperly using
Rule 36 to highlight a problem with the Federal Circuit’s
current practice.

76. Litigants and scholars alike have expressly stated a belief that the Federal Circuit
is dodging important questions of statutory interpretation through persistent use of Rule 36.
See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 21, Pactiv, LLC v. Lee, 137 S. Ct. 248 (2016) (No. 16205), 2016 WL 4363501 (“The Federal Circuit cannot avoid answering thorny questions of
statutory interpretation by routinely issuing single-word summary affirmances.”); Brief of
Amicus Curiae Raymond A. Mercado at 22, Pactiv, LLC v. Lee, 137 S. Ct. 248 (2016) (No. 16205), 2016 WL 4921165 (“The Federal Circuit has twice dodged an important issue of
statutory construction, affirming the case without opinion under a rule permitting it to do so
when ‘an opinion would have no precedential value,’ even though no direct precedent on this
question exists.”).
77. United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit Historical Caseload, U.S. CT.
APPEALS FOR FED. CIR. (2016), http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/the-court
/statistics/FY16_Caseload_Overall_2.pdf.
78. Id.
79. In the sense that the number of Federal Circuit judges and clerks has not increased.
80. See generally Charles E. Clark, Making Courts Efficient, 8 UCLA L. REV. 489 (1961)
(discussing why efficiency is important and some efforts made to improve judicial efficiency).
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B. Hindering Development of Patent Law
Summary disposition is an effective means of dismissing
frivolous claims or suits that do not present a question of
importance, but it comes with a significant error cost.81 Most
circuits—including the Federal Circuit—agree that when a
published opinion is not produced, a case cannot serve as
precedent. “The heart of the common law [sic] system is the written
judicial opinion.”82 Opinions “are what courts do . . . . They are the
substance of judicial action . . . .”83 Written opinions are key to the
operation of our system of stare decisis,84 and without them, the
state of the law would be in confusion. “[J]udges and lawyers are
utterly dependent upon published opinions to research, evaluate,
argue, and decide cases—the most basic of legal tasks.”85
Publishing opinions is a key function of appellate courts inasmuch
the federal courts of appeals are “needed to announce, clarify, and
harmonize the rules of decision employed by the legal system in
which they serve.”86 This function is particularly important in an
age in which the Supreme Court hears a mere fraction of appellate
court cases.87
81. Many scholars and judges have discussed the potential drawbacks of summary
disposition of appeals. See, e.g., Nat’l Classification Comm. v. United States, 765 F.2d 164, 174
(D.C. Cir. 1985) (“[T]his court should at least give the parties a statement of reasons in the
court’s own words, if for no other reason than to indicate that the court in fact thoughtfully
reviewed the agency’s determination.”); United States v. Glover, 731 F.2d 41, 48–53 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (Mikva, J., dissenting) (expressing concerns with deviating from the normal appellate
process); William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, Limited Publication in the Fourth and
Sixth Circuits, 1979 DUKE L.J. 807, 814–15 (1979) (suggesting that the limited publication rule
does not increase judicial productivity); Charles R. Haworth, Screening and Summary Procedures in the United States Courts of Appeals, 1973 WASH. U. L.Q. 257, 320 (1973) (explaining
some of the consequences of summary disposition in the federal courts of appeals). I choose
to focus on how summary affirmance hinders development of the law.
82. John Reid, Doe Did Not Sit—the Creation of Opinions by an Artist, 63 COLUM. L. REV.
59, 59 (1963).
83. Robert A. Leflar, Some Observations Concerning Judicial Opinions, 61 COLUM. L. REV.
810, 819 (1961).
84. Martha J. Dragich, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Perish if They Publish? Or Does
the Declining Use of Opinions to Explain and Justify Judicial Decisions Pose a Greater Threat?, 44
AM. U. L. REV. 757, 770–75 (1995) (discussing the relationship between published opinions
and stare decisis).
85. Id. at 759.
86. PAUL D. CARRINGTON ET AL., JUSTICE ON APPEAL 3 (1976).
87. Between September 30, 2014, and September 30, 2015, 34,244 cases were decided
on the merits in the courts of appeals (not including the Federal Circuit). ADMIN. OFFICE OF
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The number of appeals has dramatically increased over the last
few decades88 while the number of cases heard by the Supreme
Court has dropped.89 The congruence of these two events has
resulted in the appellate courts adopting a more important role as
“the courts of last resort for the vast majority of litigants.”90 The
federal courts of appeals “have become important policymakers,”91
leading some to suggest that “[j]udges on the U.S. courts of appeals
are among the most powerful people in American politics.”92 In the
nineteenth century, some argued that judges do not “make” law—
they only find and declare it.93 That belief is now largely considered
fantasy, with most contending that judges do “make” law
inasmuch as they develop the common law, interpret statutes, and
create precedent.94 This is certainly true with regard to the
Federal Circuit.
Up until the last decade, the Supreme Court had all but fled
from the patent law scene, making the Federal Circuit “the de
facto supreme court of patents.”95 Although the Supreme Court
has developed a greater interest in the development of patent law,
the Federal Circuit remains the primary developer, 96 consistent
U.S. COURTS, Judicial Business of the United States Courts, in ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR
OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS tbl. B (2015). That same year, 4715 petitions
for review on writ of certiorari were filed from the circuit courts (not including the Federal
Circuit), and only 136 were granted, representing a mere 0.4% of cases terminated in the
federal courts of appeals. Id. at tbl. B-2.
88. Catterson, supra note 55, at 287.
89. Adam Liptak, The Case of the Plummeting Supreme Court Docket, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 28, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/29/us/29bar.html?_r=0.
90. JENNIFER BARNES BOWIE ET AL., THE VIEW FROM THE BENCH AND CHAMBERS: EXAMINING JUDICIAL PROCESS AND DECISION MAKING ON THE U.S. COURT OF APPEALS 1 (2014).
91. Id. at 2.
92. Id. at 11.
93. Many of these arguments were founded on the philosophy of William Blackstone.
See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 63, 67–73 (Oxford
Clarendon Press, 1765).
94. See EDWARD F. HENNESSEY, JUDGES MAKING LAW 1 (1994); LOUIS L. JAFFE, ENGLISH
AND AMERICAN JUDGES AS LAWMAKERS 2 (1969); Lord Reid, The Judge as Law Maker, 12 J. SOC ’Y
PUB. TCHR. L. 22, 22 (1972).
95. Mark D. Janis, Patent Law in the Age of the Invisible Supreme Court, 2001 U. ILL. L.
REV. 387, 387 (2001).
96. Multiple reasons explain why the Federal Circuit remains, by and large, the developer of patent law. First, the Supreme Court often relies on the presence of a circuit split as
an indicator when determining what cases to review. SUP. CT. R. 10; see H.W. PERRY, JR.,
DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 246 (1991).
The Federal Circuit’s unique jurisdiction makes it difficult for the Supreme Court to rely on
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with the role Congress envisioned when the Federal Circuit
was created.97
Through the early 2000s, the Federal Circuit arguably did an
effective job fulfilling its purpose to unify patent law.98 And
although the Federal Circuit by and large still fulfills this
responsibility, recent use of Rule 36 summary affirmance has
detracted from the court’s central function. Rather than address
pressing issues, the Federal Circuit has employed Rule 36 to the
confusion of litigants and the lower courts, ultimately increasing
litigation costs.
Some may argue that the PTAB’s decisions and subsequent
affirmances on appeal are a sufficient guide for litigants. Since the
creation of PTAB proceedings, the Federal Circuit has decided 113
PTAB appeals.99 The Federal Circuit affirmed every issue in ninety
(79.65%) of the cases.100 Some practitioners suggest that this high
affirmance rate can be used as a guide for litigants wrestling with
unresolved issues. Even assuming this pattern of affirmance is a
good indicator of the Federal Circuit’s disposition, a key function
of the Federal Circuit is to clarify patent law. The PTAB was not
created to establish patent precedent—that role remains with the
Federal Circuit.

this indicator when reviewing Federal Circuit decisions. Ryan Stephenson, Federal Circuit
Case Selection at the Supreme Court: An Empirical Analysis, 102 GEO. L.J. 271, 275 (2013). Second,
the Federal Circuit’s expertise makes it the prime court to review patent issues. Zachary
Shapiro, Patent Law, Expertise, and the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, HARV. L.: BILL OF
HEALTH (July 14, 2015, 1:43 AM), http://blogs.harvard.edu/billofhealth/2015/07/14/patent
-law-expertise-and-the-court-of-appeals-for-the-federal-circuit/. One needs only look to the
Supreme Court’s decision in Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics to see the
confusion that can potentially stem from nonexperts tackling patent issues. See Heidi
Ledford, Myriad Ruling Causes Confusion, 498 NATURE 281 (2013) (explaining the confusion
caused by the Court’s decision).
97. See MARKEY, supra note 16, at 2; Marion T. Bennett, The United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit—Origins, in U NITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL
CIRCUIT: A HISTORY: 1990–2002, at 3, 9–10 (2004) (suggesting that concerns over the state of
patent law in America spurred the creation of the Federal Circuit).
98. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, In Search of Institutional Identity: The Federal Circuit
Comes of Age, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 787, 788–89 (2008).
99. Klodowski, supra note 70.
100. Id. (including sixty-one cases where the court issued Rule 36 affirmances).
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A habit of summary affirmance gives the impression—whether
warranted or not—that the court is results oriented.101 Although
litigants can present their merit arguments, the court has the final
say on which appeals will be summarily disposed. Without a view
into the black box of the court, there is a real risk that the public will
believe the court is adjudicating for results and not justice. And
with no opinion to explain their rationale, courts are helpless to
respond to such accusations.
In Owen Fiss’s seminal work, Against Settlement, Fiss argues
that settlement brings peace, but not necessarily justice.102 The sigh
of the judge whose case settles “is not a recognition that a job is
done” but instead is an acknowledgment “that another case has
been ‘moved along.’”103 While there can be value to avoidance, the
lack of a judicial decision comes at a cost to society.104 Megan
La Belle applies this idea in the patent context, reasoning that
settlement causes unpredictability in patent law.105 The dearth of
precedent caused by high proportions of settlement is particularly
glaring in the patent world where development of the law is largely
left to the courts.106 Summary affirmance has a similar effect as
settlement—the precedential value of a decision is lost. Rule 36
attempts to balance the worth of a precedential opinion with
efficiency. Although efficiency is certainly a relevant and important
public value, efficiency should not sharply undermine development of the law.107

101. See John E. Simonett, The Use of the Term “Result-Oriented” to Characterize Appellate
Decisions, 10 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 187, 196–200 (1984).
102. Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085–86 (1984).
103. Id. at 1086.
104. Id. at 1085–86; see Jill E. Fisch, Rewriting History: The Propriety of Eradicating Prior
Decisional Law Through Settlement and Vacatur, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 589, 630 (1991); see also
supra Section II.B (discussing the costs of summary disposition).
105. Megan M. La Belle, Against Settlement of (Some) Patent Cases, 67 VAND . L. REV. 375,
405 (2014).
106. Id. at 405–06 (“[D]ecisional law, specifically Federal Circuit jurisprudence, has
primarily formed and defined the patent landscape.”).
107. Additionally, a strong argument can be made that a precedential opinion actually
increases the efficiency of the court system. See Fisch, supra note 104, at 591 (“[F]inality
increases the efficiency of the judicial system by acting as a bar to relitigation of the same
and similar claims and issues. . . .”).
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In the years following the passage of the AIA, the Federal
Circuit repeatedly punted on important issues.108 I consider a few
of these issues to highlight a flaw with the court’s summary
affirmance practice.109
1. Motion to amend claims
The IPR introduced a method for patent owners to amend a
patent by cancelling any challenged patent claim or by proposing
substitute claims, so long as such substituted claims do not “enlarge
the scope of the claims of the patent or introduce new matter.”110
Although the USPTO provided some additional details concerning
motions to amend,111 important questions, such as the requirements
for amending claims, were initially left unanswered. Questions
surrounding the motion to amend procedure, although not the
hallmark of most patent disputes, were important and relevant
inasmuch as motions to amend were filed by patent owners in
twelve percent of all completed AIA proceedings.112
In Helferich Patent Licensing, LLC v. CBS Interactive Inc., the PTAB
determined that the challenged claims of a patent were unpatentable as obvious based on prior art references.113 The Board also
denied the patent owner’s motion to amend.114 In support of this
conclusion, the PTAB stated that the patent owner failed to provide
reasonable construction of the claim features added in the
substitute claims, identify the written description support for the
substitute claim, and prove that the new claims were patentable.115
On appeal, the patent owner argued that it had clearly met the

108. See supra Section I.A.3.
109. Before proceeding into these issues, I note that within the last year the Federal

Circuit has resolved a few questions related to these matters. Nonetheless, the court’s delay
hindered development of the law and increased confusion and litigation costs.
110. 35 U.S.C. § 316(d) (2012).
111. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.21(d) (2015).
112. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD MOTION TO
AMEND STUDY 3 (2016), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2016-04
-30%20PTAB%20MTA%20study.pdf.
113. CBS Interactive, Inc. v. Helferich Patent Licensing, LLC, No. IPR2013-00033, Paper
122 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 3, 2014).
114. Id. at 50.
115. Id. at 51–58.
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motion to amend requirements established in 37 C.F.R. § 42.121.116
Those requirements do not include establishing patentability as a
condition of amending a claim. The patent owner argued that
shifting the burden of proof to a patent owner would conflict with
the AIA.117 Although the AIA gives the USPTO authority to
promulgate regulations “setting forth standards and procedures
for allowing the patent owner to move to amend the patent under
[§ 316(d)],”118 this delegation did not confer on the USPTO
authority to alter the statutory burden of proof. The USPTO
intervened and argued that its procedures were in line with
Congress’s purpose behind creating IPR proceedings—to eliminate
claims that should not have been issued.119 Although the general
motions practice rule of 37 C.F.R. § 42.20(c) places the burden of
proof on the moving party, that regulation “is a procedural rule
allocating the burden of proof in motions practice; it does not
change the substantive showing required, which is spelled out in
section 42.121.”120 Notwithstanding this ambiguity in the law, the
Federal Circuit summarily affirmed the PTAB’s decision.121
The Federal Circuit has since resolved this motion to amend
issue.122 In Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc., the Federal Circuit
deferred to the PTAB’s reasoning, affirming that, among other
things, the patent owner bears the burden of proving patentability
of amended claims.123 The Federal Circuit could have easily
employed this strategy in Helfrich Patent Licensing, LCC to affirm the
PTAB’s decision and simultaneously clarify the law. Instead, the

116. Brief for Appellants at 41–42, Helferich Patent Licensing, LLC v. CBS Interactive,
Inc., 599 F. App’x 995 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (No. 2014-1556).
117. Id. at 45 (“In an inter partes review instituted under this chapter, the petitioner
shall have the burden of proving a proposition of unpatentability by a preponderance of the
evidence.”) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 316(e)).
118. 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(9).
119. Brief for Intervenor, Helferich Patent Licensing, LLC v. CBS Interactive, Inc., 599
F. App’x 955 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (No. 14-1556).
120. Reply Brief of Appellants at 18, Helferich Patent Licensing, LLC v. CBS Interactive, Inc., 599 F. App’x 955 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (No. 14-1556).
121. Helferich Patent Licensing, LLC v. CBS Interactive, Inc., 599 F. App’x 955 (Fed. Cir.
2015) (mem.).
122. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc., 789 F.3d 1292, 1306–08 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(“The Board has reasonably interpreted these provisions as requiring the patentee to show
that its substitute claims are patentable over the prior art of record. . . .”).
123. Id. at 1307–08.
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Federal Circuit waited a year before declaring an important motion
to amend standard. Perhaps Helfrich Patent Licensing, LLC was
summarily affirmed for justifiable reasons, but the striking
similarities in the issues between these two cases suggests that the
Federal Circuit missed an opportunity to provide a helpful,
precedential opinion.
2. Waiver
In Nichia Corp. v. Emcore Corp., the PTAB construed a patent
owner’s claims as obvious and therefore unpatentable.124 The
patent owner argued that the petitioner’s references to prior art
deviated from the claimed method. 125 In its response to a motion to
amend claims, the petitioner introduced a new reference in hopes
of rebutting the patent owner’s argument.126 Relying in part on this
new reference, the PTAB rejected the patent owner’s defense.127
On appeal, the patent owner argued that it was improper for
the PTAB to consider the petitioner’s new reference submitted in
petitioner’s response to a motion to amend claims.128 The USPTO
argued that because the patent owner failed to move to exclude the
reference before the PTAB, it had waived this argument.129 The
patent owner defended its argument by contending that it “had no
obligation to move to exclude evidence that was never offered for
the purpose for which the Board ultimately used it.”130 Petitioner
did not submit the reference to invalidate the original claim, but to
invalidate the amended claims.131 Despite this waiver issue, the
Federal Circuit issued a Rule 36 judgment.132

124. Nichia Corp. v. Emcore Corp., No. IPR2012-00005, Paper 68 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 11, 2014).
125. See Anthony C. Tridico et al., PTAB Affirmance at the Federal Circuit, FINNEGAN (June

2015), https://www.finnegan.com/en/insights/ptab-affirmance-at-the-federal-circuit.html.
126. Nichia’s Opposition to Encore’s Motion to Amend, Nichia Corp. v. Emcore Corp.,
No. IPR2012-00005 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 30, 2013), 2013 WL 5379466.
127. Nichia Corp., No. IPR2012-00005, Paper 68.
128. Tridico et al., supra note 125.
129. Brief for Intervenor at 18–23, Emcore Corp. v. Nichia Corp., 599 F. App’x 959 (Fed.
Cir. 2015) (No. 14-1508).
130. Reply Brief for Appellant at 2, Emcore Corp. v. Nichia Corp., 599 F. App’x 959
(Fed. Cir. 2015) (No. 14-1508).
131. See Nichia’s Opposition to Emcore’s Motion to Amend at 5–9, Emcore Corp. v.
Nichia Corp., No. IPR2012-00005 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 30, 2013), 2013 WL 5379466.
132. Emcore Corp. v. Nichia Corp., 599 F. Appx. 959 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (mem.).

438

HOFFMAN_EE2 (DO NOT DELETE)

419

9/7/18 10:04 AM

The Federal Circuit’s Summary Affirmance Habit

The Federal Circuit has responded to other waiver questions
such as whether a patent owner’s arguments made only in a
preliminary response are waived on appeal.133 However, Emcore
Corp. presented an interesting IPR specific waiver issue the Federal
Circuit has yet to resolve. Like in Helfrich Patent Licensing, LCC, the
Federal Circuit may have been justified in its issuance of a Rule 36
judgment. However, by summarily affirming the decision of the
PTAB, the Federal Circuit missed the opportunity to answer an
important waiver question.
III. EXPLANATIONS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S
SUMMARY AFFIRMANCE PRACTICE
In an ideal world, the Federal Circuit would issue an opinion in
every case it heard. However, the ideal world is not reality. Circuit
courts are overrun with appeals. Summary disposition is a useful
and arguably necessary tool used to control a court’s docket. But if
summary disposition was used solely to control an overrun docket,
one would expect the circuit courts with the largest caseloads to use
summary disposition the most; such is not the case. The Federal
Circuit—whose caseload is dwarfed by other circuit courts’
dockets134—uses summary affirmance on a much more regular
basis,135 suggesting that factors beyond docket size may be
contributing to the court’s summary affirmance rate.
A. De Novo Review
The de novo standard of review often employed by the Federal
Circuit likely contributes to the court’s frequent use of summary
affirmance. Most appellate courts apply a “substantial evidence” or

133. Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert.
denied, 136 S. Ct. 2510 (2016); SAP Am., Inc., v. Versata Dev. Grp., Inc., No. CBM2012-00001,
Paper 81 at 3, 2013 WL 8605252 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 13, 2013) (holding Versata waived issues not
raised once the trial was instituted).
134. For example, in 2015, 11,531 cases were initiated in the Ninth Circuit and 7843
cases commenced in the Eleventh Circuit. During the 2015 fiscal year, 1711 appeals were filed
in the Federal Circuit. See sources cited infra note 192.
135. Ted L. Field, “Judicial Hyperactivity” in the Federal Circuit: An Empirical Study, 47
U.S.F. L. REV. 721, 746 (2012) (“The Federal Circuit was the only one of the circuits studied
that uses summary affirmances in any appreciable amount.”).
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“clearly erroneous” standard when reviewing questions of fact.136
The Federal Circuit is unique in that it regularly uses a de novo
standard when reviewing matters that “are undeniably factual in
nature,” leading one practitioner to suggest the court has a “love
affair with de novo review.”137 De novo review requires an appellate
court to comb the record and become pseudo-experts in the case
subject matter, a task that takes time. The Federal Circuit may be
using summary affirmance as a means of compensating for the
extra time spent reviewing factual decisions in complex cases.
Some Federal Circuit judges have acknowledged flaws with the
court’s rampant de novo review, suggesting the court “must avoid
the temptation to label everything legal and usurp the province of
the fact finder with [a] manufactured de novo review.”138 The
Supreme Court has likewise acknowledged the issue and recently
decided to curb the practice in the context of claim construction.139
However, given the recency and narrowness of the Court’s
decision, it is difficult to know whether the Federal Circuit’s obsession with de novo review will come to an end. If it does not, the
court may continue to use summary affirmance as a means of
creating time to thoroughly review select cases.
B. Then and Now: The Current Need for Summary Affirmance
It is possible that prior to the recent increase in the number of
appeals, the Federal Circuit was issuing opinions in cases in which
use of Rule 36 was justified. Thus, what the court may be doing now
is simply summarily affirming where they could have already been

136. See Martha S. Davis, A Basic Guide to Standards of Judicial Review, 33 S.D. L. REV. 469,
475–81 (1988).
137. Gene Quinn, Supremes End Federal Circuit Love Affair with De Novo Review,
IPWATCHDOG (Jan. 20, 2015), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/01/20/supremes-end
-federal-circuit-love-affair-with-de-novo-review/id=53873/; see also Paul R. Gugliuzza, The
Federal Circuit as a Federal Court, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1791, 1820–21, 1831–36 (2013)
(explaining that the court often gives little deference to the USPTO and district courts).
138. Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 701 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (dissenting opinion).
139. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 835 (2015) (“We
hold that the appellate court must apply a ‘clear error,’ not a de novo, standard of review.”).
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doing so.140 If this is the case, the court is obviously justified in
its practice.
Even though the Federal Circuit decides fewer cases than other
circuits, most agree that the subject matter the court deals with can
be quite complicated.141 Combine the complicated nature of the
court’s cases with the increase in appeals from the PTAB and you
get the perfect recipe for justifying an increased use of summary affirmance.
C. Panel Collegiality
An additional contributing factor could be an attempt to
maintain panel collegiality. Judges care about collegiality on the
bench.142 And on a court that works in panels, disagreement is
uncomfortable and often results in additional work, such as issuing
an opinion. Summary affirmance provides a means to avoid this
extra work while creating unanimity. Additionally, judges may
have strategic goals beyond articulating the law or promoting
ideological preferences.143 For example, a judge may desire to be in
the majority, further the aims of the court at large, “or build[]
capital for future cases.”144
D. Inadequate Briefing
Another factor could be inadequate party briefing. Many are of
the view that judges should answer only the questions explicitly

140. See Ryan Davis, Fed. Circ.’s Embrace of PTAB to Fuel More AIA Reviews, LAW360
(Mar. 8, 2016, 1:41 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/767549 (“The purpose of writing
an opinion is to provide guidance to the lower courts and litigants. . . . If all the Federal Circuit
is doing is reviewing a fact-intensive determination on settled legal principles, there may be no
guidance to be given and less use for a written opinion.”) (internal quotations omitted).
141. See Jennifer F. Miller, Should Juries Hear Complex Patent Cases?, 4 DUKE L. & TECH.
REV. 1, 13 (2004) (“Patent litigation involves some of the most complex legal theories and
underlying factual issues of any type of litigation today.”).
142. See VIRGINIA A. HETTINGER, STEFANIE A. LINDQUIST & WENDY L. MARTINEK, JUDGING ON A COLLEGIAL COURT: INFLUENCES ON FEDERAL APPELLATE DECISION MAKING 112 (2006).
143. See generally LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998)
(discussing the strategic model of judicial decision-making).
144. Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision Making, 151 U. PA.
L. REV. 1639, 1653 (2003). To clarify, Judge Edwards opposes this view of strategic judicial
decision-making. See id. at 1645–46.
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presented before the court.145 If parties fail to adequately brief
important, unanswered questions, fault arguably rests with the
litigants and not the court.146 Summary affirmance may be perfectly
appropriate if the potential for legal precedent is abolished by
insufficient or scanty briefing.147
E. Cert-Proofing
Although the aforementioned factors may be the causes of the
Federal Circuit’s high summary affirmance rate, below, I consider
one additional hypothesis that, if true, is a cause of great concern
and certainly justifies the call for reducing the court’s summary
affirmance rate: “cert-proofing.” By issuing a summary affirmance,
the court potentially shields the case from future Supreme Court
review.148 While this hypothesis likely does not fully explain the
court’s practice, it is a plausible factor in light of the recent
relationship between the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court.149
As shown in section II.B, multiple cases recently appealed to the
Federal Circuit present interesting questions of law. The Federal
Circuit’s summary affirmances with respect to these issues not only
hindered development of the law but they limited Supreme Court
145. See Sarah M.R. Cravens, Involved Appellate Judging, 88 MARQUETTE L. REV. 251, 254–
55 (2004).
146. See Becton Dickinson & Co. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 922 F.2d 792, 800 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
(“[A]n issue not raised by an appellant in its opening brief . . . is waived”); Cubic Def. Sys.,
Inc. v. United States, 45 Fed. Cl. 450, 467 (1999) (“Any experienced appellate litigator knows
that issues not raised in a brief are waived.”).
147. The complexity of patents aside, it is difficult to see why patent litigators would
be significantly worse at briefing issues than other civil litigators practicing before the other
circuit courts of appeals where summary affirmance rates are much lower.
148. See Marla Brooke Tusk, Note, No-Citation Rules as a Prior Restraint on Attorney
Speech, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1202, 1216 (2003) (“There is even some speculation that, because
the Supreme Court is less likely to grant certiorari to an appeal from an unpublished opinion,
appellate judges may decide controversial cases via unpublished opinions simply to insulate
those decisions from Supreme Court review.”).
149. I note that I am not the first to suggest that the Federal Circuit may inappropriately be using Rule 36 summary affirmance. See Paul Stancil, Cert-Proof 97–98 (J. Reuben Clark
Law Sch., Brigham Young U., Research Paper No. 16-05, Mar. 29, 2016), https://papers
.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2756112; Matthew Bultman, Fed. Cir. Asked to Decide
When Appeals Require Opinion, LAW360 (Mar. 1, 2017, 6:57 PM), https://www.law360.com
/articles/897013/fed-circ-asked-to-decide-when-appeals-require-opinion. I, like Professor
Paul Stancil, cannot definitively say that the Federal Circuit uses summary affirmance to
reduce the likelihood of Supreme Court review. I merely present cert-proofing as a plausible theory.
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review. A summary disposition is less likely to warrant review by
the Supreme Court.150 This is particularly true in the context of
Federal Circuit summary affirmances because such cases lack
precedential value.151 The Supreme Court is unlikely to consider a
case void of precedential value. Not only is such a case assumed to
lack significant questions of law, but the Court would be required
to expend extra time and resources to determine if an important,
cert-worthy question exists.152
Because Rule 36 cases are unlikely to be reviewed by the
Supreme Court and given that tension seems to exist between the
Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court,153 one could argue that the
Federal Circuit may be using summary affirmance as a means of
“cert-proofing” cases. No appellate court enjoys being overruled.154
This general statement holds true for the Federal Circuit. Multiple
scholars have pointed out that there appears to be a growing
tension between the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit.155
From its inception, the Federal Circuit has recognized its unique
role in patent law jurisprudence and asserted its position in
developing the law.156 Yet in the last decade, the Supreme Court has

150. Stancil, supra note 149, at 24; see also Rachel Hughey, How to Get to Federal Circuit
Rule 36, LAW360 (July 29, 2015, 10:19 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/684264/how
-to-get-to-federal-circuit-rule-36 (“A Rule 36 affirmance is nearly impossible to obtain rehearing or rehearing en banc, or seek U.S. Supreme Court certiorari, because there is no appellate
decision to challenge.”).
151. Rates Tech., Inc. v. Mediatrix Telecom, Inc., 688 F.3d 742, 750 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing
U.S. Surgical Corp. v. Ethicon, Inc., 103 F.3 1554, 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
152. Stancil, supra note 149, at 24.
153. Daniel Kazhdan, Beyond Patents: The Supreme Court’s Evolving Relationship with the
Federal Circuit, 94 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 275, 276 (2012).
154. See MARK HERRMANN, THE CURMUDGEON’S GUIDE TO PRACTICING LAW 4 (2006)
(“Judges do not like to be reversed. Accordingly, if a precedent contains the implicit threat
of reversal, I will use that threat (gently, of course) when I discuss that case. . . .”).
155. See, e.g., Arthur J. Gajarsa & Lawrence P. Cogswell, III, The Federal Circuit and the
Supreme Court, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 821, 844 (2006) (discussing how the Federal Circuit is
potentially becoming the “‘Ninth Circuit’ of the twenty-first century”); Gretchen S. Sween,
Who’s Your Daddy? A Psychoanalytic Exegesis of the Supreme Court’s Recent Patent Jurisprudence,
7 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 204 (2009).
156. Debra D. Peterson, Can This Brokered Marriage Be Saved? The Changing Relationship
Between the Supreme Court and Federal Circuit in Patent Law Jurisprudence, 2 J. MARSHALL REV.
INTELL. PROP. L. 201, 210–11 (2003).
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attempted to “rein in” the Federal Circuit.157 Beginning in 2005, the
Supreme Court reversed a trend of avoiding patent cases, hearing
twenty-seven cases over the next ten years and overturning the
Federal Circuit’s holding in twenty-two of those cases.158
One strong example highlighting the conflict between the
courts is the debate over the patentability of isolated human genes.
In 2011, the Federal Circuit decided a case in favor of patentability
of isolated DNA strands.159 The Supreme Court remanded the case,
instructing the Federal Circuit to consider the Court’s recent
restriction on the scope of patent-eligible subject matter. On remand, the Federal Circuit reached the same result as in 2011 using
much of the same analysis.160 As one law professor stated, “The
Federal Circuit wrote the same decision twice.”161 Not surprisingly,
the Supreme Court reviewed the case and unanimously reversed
the decision of the Federal Circuit.162 The remarks of Chief Justice
John Roberts effectively summarize the tug-of-war relationship
between the courts evident in the example just described. Speaking of the circuit courts of appeals, the Chief Justice said, “Well,
they don’t have a choice, right? They can’t say, I don’t like the
Supreme Court rule so I’m not going to apply it, other than the
Federal Circuit.”163
The theory that the court uses summary affirmance to certproof its decisions is not without flaws, the biggest being that the
Federal Circuit may have summarily affirmed each case for a
legitimate reason (i.e., an opinion would have no precedential

157. Steven Seidenberg, Tug-of-War over Interpretations of Patent Law Continues Between Federal Circuit and SCOTUS, A.B.A. J. (Jan. 1, 2016, 3:00 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/maga
zine/article/tug_of_war_over_interpretations_of_patent_law_continues_between_federal.
158. Id.
159. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 1329,
1351 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. granted, judgment vacated sub nom; Ass’n for Molecular Pathology
v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012), and opinion vacated, appeal reinstated sub nom.;
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 467 F. App’x 890 (Fed.
Cir. 2012).
160. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303
(Fed. Cir. 2012), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom.; Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad
Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013).
161. Seidenberg, supra note 157.
162. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013).
163. Transcript of Oral Argument at 18, Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF BIO, Inc., 556 U.S.
635 (2009) (No. 07-1437) (emphasis added).
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value and the trial court or administrative agency correctly decided
the case). Qualifying for summary disposition is not an easy task.
A party must show that its position “is so clearly correct as a matter
of law that no substantial question regarding the outcome of the
appeal exists.”164 This high bar checks the courts from disposing of
meritorious questions of law. Yet, as the case sampling herein
reveals, it seems likely that substantial questions of law have been
ignored by the Federal Circuit.165
An additional counter-argument against the idea of certproofing is that no case is ever truly cert-proofed. “[T]he Court
grants certiorari to review unpublished and summary decisions
with some frequency.”166 As recently as 2015, the Supreme Court
reviewed an appellate summary affirmance decision.167 The Justices
themselves have noted that an unpublished opinion—the effect of
which is similar to a summary affirmance—sometimes signals to
the Court the need for review.168 Although the Court certainly can
and does sometimes review summarily affirmed cases, the simple
truth is that the likelihood of granting such review is decreased.169
Since the inception of the AIA, no summarily affirmed Federal
Circuit case has generated certiorari from the Supreme Court.
A survey of cert petitions emerging from cases summarily
affirmed by the Federal Circuit reveals the potential for certproofing. I have chosen to examine three cases—Hyundai Motor
America, Inc. v. Clear with Computers, LLC; Cloud Satchel, LLC v.
Barnes & Noble, Inc.; and Luv N’ Care Ltd. v. Munchkin, Inc.—to
illustrate this point.

164. Joshua v. U.S., 17 F.3d 378, 380 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
165. Even if “substantial” questions of law are not being ignored, “cases are rarely

identical and it can be argued that a rule of law develops and gains certainty in the frequency
and changing circumstances in which it is expressed and applied.” Simonett, supra note 101,
at 199.
166. STEPHEN M. SHAPIRO ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 264 (10th ed. 2013).
167. See Christeson v. Roper, 135 S. Ct. 891 (2015).
168. See Plumley v. Austin, 135 S. Ct. 828, 831 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari) (noting that the decision not to publish was “another reason to grant review”).
169. See Stancil, supra note 149, at 24 (arguing that a summary affirmance is unlikely to
generate certiorari because (1) the Court may be influenced by the traditional understanding
that such opinions are less important and (2) the Court will have to invest additional time
and energy to determine if a cert-worthy issue is present).
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Before proceeding, I wish to clarify that I do not intend to
suggest that the Federal Circuit is consistently and blatantly seeking to evade Supreme Court review. It is unlikely that cert-proofing
is the driving explanation for the court’s summary affirmance rate.
I simply argue that it is plausible that a panel may dispose of a case
(or group of cases related to the same issue) using summary
affirmance hoping, be it consciously or subconsciously, that the
case will not find its way to the Supreme Court.170
1. Hyundai Motor America, Inc. v. Clear with Computers, LLC
Clear with Computers, LLC (CWC) filed a patent infringement
suit against Hyundai Motor America, Inc. (HMA), alleging that
HMA infringed on a patent for an electronic proposal preparation
system. CWC secured an $11.6 million judgment in the district
court. This suit represented CWC’s sixth attempt to sue HMA, each
suit being a variation on the same theme, and all prior suits were
resolved in HMA’s favor.171 At trial and on appeal, HMA argued
that prior to the filing of CWC’s patent application, “the marketplace was awash in electronic proposal” preparation systems.172
HMA also objected to jury instruction that HMA bears the burden
of proving invalidity by the clear and convincing evidence
standard.173 HMA contended that such a standard to patent
invalidity, without distinguishing between factual and legal
aspects of the inquiry, conflicts with Supreme Court precedent.
Specifically, a clear and convincing evidence standard should
apply only to factual matters, such as whether a prior art reference
had been published, and should not be considered in determining

170. Regardless of the court’s intentions, it should be reemphasized that litigation costs
and legal ambiguities could be reduced if the court took a hard look at its summary
affirmance habit.
171. Brief for Appellant at 1, Clear with Computers, LLC v. Hyundai Motor America,
Inc., No. 2012-1291 (Fed. Cir. June 27, 2012), 2012 WL 9082954, at *1.
172. Id. at 3.
173. Id. at 66.
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how to apply the law to the facts.174 HMA also raised an interesting
question concerning the “anticipation doctrine.”175
The Federal Circuit passed over the opportunity to decide the
validity of non-practicing inventors’176 method patents and the
proper extent of the “anticipation doctrine” in modern patent law.
In its petition for writ of certiorari, HMA argued that there was no
justification for the Federal Circuit’s “one-line summary affirmance.”177 HMA found the court’s summary affirmance egregious
given that Congress established the Federal Circuit for the express
purpose of promoting unity in patent law, and the court’s one-line
decisions leaves parties and the lower courts in confusion.178
HMA’s pleas for review did not resonate with the Supreme
Court as its petition for certiorari was denied. Like with many cert
denials, one cannot know exactly why the Supreme Court chose to
deny HMA’s petition. However, given that the Supreme Court has
been reluctant to review summarily disposed cases, it is likely that
the Federal Circuit’s summary affirmance played a role in the
denial of HMA’s cert petition.
2. Cloud Satchel, LLC v. Barnes & Noble, Inc.
In Cloud Satchel, LLC v. Barnes & Noble, Inc., a district court
invalidated a patent for memory-conserving wireless exchange of
documents between a handheld device and remote database. Cloud
Satchel questioned whether the district court correctly applied the

174. Microsoft Corp. v. I4I Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 114 (2011) (“[I]n this area of law as
in others the evidentiary standard of proof applies to questions of fact and not to questions
of law.”).
175. Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., 339 F.3d 1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“A patent
is invalid for anticipation if a single prior art reference discloses each and every limitation of
the claimed invention. Moreover, a prior art reference may anticipate without disclosing a
feature of the claimed invention if that missing characteristic is necessarily present, or
inherent, in the single anticipating reference.”) (internal citation omitted).
176. In other words, “patent trolls.” “A patent troll uses patents as legal weapons,
instead of actually creating any new products or coming up with new ideas. Trolls are in the
business of litigation (or even just threatening litigation). They often buy up patents cheaply
from companies down on their luck who are looking to monetize what resources they have
left, such as patents.” Patent Trolls, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, https://www.eff
.org/issues/resources-patent-troll-victims.
177. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 26, Hyundai Motor America, Inc. v. Clear with
Computers, LLC, 134 S. Ct. 619 (2013) (No. 13-296).
178. Id. at 29.
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two-step analysis required by Alice Corporation v. CLS Bank and
argued that the Federal Circuit’s use of Rule 36 to affirm the district
court’s ruling defies the right to appeal set forth in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1295(a). In its petition for certiorari, Cloud Satchel argued that
“[t]he most prevalent and significant issue facing litigants of patent
rights today is the proper application of [the Supreme] Court’s
decision in Alice to cases involving computer and internet
technology.”179 The Federal Circuit’s brief affirmance of the lower
court’s decision skirted this “significant issue.”180 As the lone patent
law gatekeeper below the Supreme Court, the Federal Circuit
shirked its responsibility when it failed to provide “a reasoned
opinion that would provide the parties . . . [and] the district courts
additional guidance on how to avoid improperly applying Alice.”181
Cloud Satchel argued that the Federal Circuit’s use of summary
affirmance “has reduced the right to appeal . . . to simply a right to
a hollow affirmation of an improper lower court opinion.”182
The general reception toward Alice was that the Court failed to
provide sufficient guidance for future cases.183 Cloud Satchel
presented the Supreme Court with an opportunity to clearly define
principles such as the boundary between abstract ideas and patenteligible implementations of ideas. Nonetheless, the Court denied
Cloud Satchel’s petition for certiorari.184 Although multiple factors
may have contributed to the cert denial, the Federal Circuit’s
summary affirmance likely created a hurdle the Court chose not
to jump.

179. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 34, Cloud Satchel, LLC v. Barnes & Noble, Inc.,
136 S. Ct. 1723 (2016) (No. 15-1161).
180. For a list of other cases where this has been raised and summarily affirmed by the
Federal Circuit, see Harter & Quinn, supra note 10.
181. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 179, at 35.
182. Id.
183. See Brian Fung, The Supreme Court’s Decision on Software Patents Still Doesn’t Settle
the Bigger Question, WASH. POST (June 20, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news
/the-switch/wp/2014/06/20/the-supreme-courts-decision-on-software-patents-still-doesnt
-settle-the-bigger-question/ (“[T]he court decided the most basic conflict in the case, but more
or less declined to offer guidance for other, future cases.”); Rob Merges, Symposium: Go Ask
Alice—What Can You Patent After Alice v. CLS Bank?, SCOTUSBLOG (June 20, 2014, 12:04 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/06/symposium-go-ask-alice-what-can-you-patent-after
-alice-v-cls-bank/ (“To say we did not get an answer is to miss the depth of the non-answer
we did get.”).
184. Cloud Satchel, LLC v. Barnes & Noble, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1723 (2016).
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3. Luv N’ Care Ltd. v. Munchkin, Inc.
Luv N’ Care Ltd. v. Munchkin, Inc. presented a number of
meritorious issues. First, the case came to the Federal Circuit on
appeal from an IPR proceeding before the PTAB. Additionally, the
case represented the first IPR of a design patent. The PTAB
instituted review on obviousness grounds of a patent directed to
the ornamental design for a drinking cup. During the proceeding,
the PTAB rejected an argument that the references used to
challenge Luv N’ Care’s (LNC) patent were not prior art. The PTAB
also denied LNC’s motion to amend a claim, finding that such an
amendment would improperly enlarge the claimed subject matter.
The latter issue is particularly interesting given that the Federal
Circuit had offered little to no guidance on the requirements for
amending claims during an IPR proceeding. On appeal to the
Federal Circuit, LNC argued that the PTAB unfairly introduced
new issues in its final written decision in violation of due process
rights and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).185 Despite the
importance and novelty of the issues, the Federal Circuit affirmed
the PTAB’s decision without an opinion.186
In its petition for certiorari, LNC sought review of its case by
arguing that the PTAB inappropriately conducted the administrative trial, denying petitioner due process guarantees. Again, the
Supreme Court denied the petition.187 Because the antedating
references and motion to amend claims issues were not preserved
on appeal, it is very unlikely that the Supreme Court would have
decided those issues.188 However, the confluence of the APA and
due process rights, as they relate to raising new issues in a final
decision, is something the Supreme Court would perhaps deem
warranting judicial review. Yet again, it would seem that the
Federal Circuit’s summary affirmance may have provided the
necessary insulation from the Supreme Court.

185. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 20–24, Luv n’ Care, Ltd. v. Munchkin, Inc., 136
S. Ct. 405 (2015) (No. 15-242).
186. Granted, Luv N’ Care did not challenge the PTAB’s denial of its motion to amend
on appeal.
187. Luv N’ Care, Ltd. v. Munchkin, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 405 (2015).
188. SUP. CT. R. 14 (“Only the questions set out in the petition, or fairly included therein,
will be considered by the Court.”).
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In short, in each of these cases, though multiple factors likely
played a role in the court’s choice to invoke Rule 36, the potential
for cert-proofing is apparent and deserving of attention.
IV. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
Although the purpose of this Comment is to highlight an issue
in the Federal Circuit and not definitively propose solutions to the
problem, some plausible solutions (and their shortcomings) are
worth mentioning. These solutions by and large assume the court
is using summary affirmance for the legitimate reason of reducing
its caseload.189
One possible fix is to increase the number of Federal Circuit
judges to handle the court’s expanding caseload. This solution has
been suggested as a means of assisting not only the Federal Circuit
but the judiciary as a whole.190 However, it is unlikely that the
Federal Circuit will see an increase in the number of active judges
in the near future.191 The Federal Circuit is far from overburdened
when comparing its caseload with that of the other circuits.192 Not
only is it unlikely that the Federal Circuit will see an increase in the
number of active judges, but this solution is also not without

189. If the court is using summary affirmance for illegitimate reasons, a more dramatic
solution may be necessary.
190. Jennifer Bendery, Federal Judges Are Burned Out, Overworked and Wondering Where
Congress Is, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 1, 2015, 2:15 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com
/entry/judge-federal-courts-vacancies_us_55d77721e4b0a40aa3aaf14b (“The last time Congress passed a major judgeship bill was in 1990. Since then, there’s been a 39 percent increase
in filings at district and circuit courts but only a 4 percent increase in judgeships. The Judicial
Conference recommended in March that Congress create 77 more judgeships for district
courts and five more for circuit courts to keep up with current workloads.”).
191. Michel, supra note 57, at 1190 (“Similarly, it is unlikely that the complement of
authorized, active judges on the court, which now stands at twelve, will ever be increased.
The total number of cases decided per year by the court is already considerably less than
other circuits.”). Perhaps the complexity of the court’s docket would justify increasing the
number of judges. But again, this is unlikely.
192. See, e.g., Table B-8. United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit—Appeals Filed,
Terminated, and Pending During the Twelve-Month Period Ended September 30, 2015, U.S. CT.
APPEALS FOR FED. CIR. (2015), http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/the-court
/statistics/appeals_filed_terminated_and_pending.pdf (showing that 1711 cases were filed
in the Federal Circuit between September 30, 2014, and September 30, 2015); U.S. Courts of
Appeals Federal Court Management Statistics (June 30, 2016), U.S. CTS. (2016), http://www.
uscourts.gov/statistics/table/na/federal-court-management-statistics/2016/06/30-2 (showing, for example, that 8675 cases were filed in the Fifth Circuit during the 2015 fiscal year).

450

HOFFMAN_EE2 (DO NOT DELETE)

419

9/7/18 10:04 AM

The Federal Circuit’s Summary Affirmance Habit

serious institutional flaws. Enlarging the size of the judiciary increases inefficiencies, internal conflicts, and uncertainty in legal outcomes.193
Another potential solution to resolving the court’s overburdened docket, and the consequential inability to issue a written
decision in many of its cases, is to decentralize patent law’s
uniformity. The Federal Circuit was designed to clarify ambiguities
in patent law jurisprudence.194 Although the court may, in part, be
achieving this goal, it is far from perfect in creating a unified body
of law. Some empirical studies suggest that the Federal Circuit is
often divided, much like other circuit courts who are often split on
areas of the law.195 Dividing patent jurisdiction could serve the
beneficial effect of creating circuit splits that allow for experimentation and for appellate courts to make informed decisions
regarding which interpretation to follow. However, the fact cannot
be denied that patent disputes are often best handled by those with
particular expertise. Patent law is quite technical, and there is a real
danger in allowing other circuit courts to adjudicate patent
appeals.196 Furthermore, patent attorneys, examiners, and bureaucrats are likely to resist any attempt to restore patent jurisdiction to
the regional circuit courts. For these reasons, many commentators

193. Harvie J. Wilkinson III, We Don’t Need More Federal Judges, WALL STREET J. (Feb. 9,
1998, 12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB886954981630694500 (explaining that the
consequences of increasing the size of the judiciary include inefficiency, litigiousness,
and intrusiveness).
194. See S. Rep. No. 97-275, at 5 (1981) (“The . . . [c]ommission singled out patent law as
an area in which the application of the law to the facts of a case often produces different
outcomes in different courtrooms in substantially similar cases.”).
195. See, e.g., Petherbridge, supra note 15, at 466 (“[I]t is at least possible that areas of
law within the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction might actually have more variety than a
comparative area of law subject to regional circuit jurisdiction.”); R. Polk Wagner & Lee
Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance,
152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1176–78 (2004) (calling for “evangelism” among individual judges to
resolve a methodological split); Patricia Martone, Why Is the Fed. Cir. So Deeply Divided on
Patent Cases?, LAW360 (Oct. 13, 2015, 6:29 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/712916
/why-is-the-fed-circ-so-deeply-divided-on-patent-cases (“[T]he outcome of an appeal has
long been quite dependent on the panel hearing the case. The disagreements have just
become more prominent.”).
196. Shapiro, supra note 96.
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are “skeptical that the Federal Circuit will be stripped of its patent
jurisdiction anytime soon.”197
The Supreme Court could further check the Federal Circuit’s
obsession with de novo review.198 Doing so would ideally free up
time needed to publish an opinion in those summarily affirmed
cases deserving a written decision. However, given the recency of
the Court’s admonition to limit de novo review,199 it seems unlikely
that the Court will step in and further chastise the Federal Circuit.
Furthermore, the reality is that patent law disputes are highly fact
intensive and some level of de novo review is arguably needed to
effectively resolve certain cases appealed to the Federal Circuit.200
A final solution201 to deal with the Federal Circuit’s growing
caseload is to publish shorter per curiam opinions that briefly
explain the essential rationale for a decision. Because judges are
identified as the authors of judicial opinions, they often feel
pressured to produce lengthy, scholarly opinions.202 One former
Federal Circuit judge has reasoned that perhaps as much as half of
the delay in the average case can be attributed to the human factor
of the opinion process.203 Published per curiam opinions could help
save the court’s time, thus allowing judges to issue more published
opinions whilst simultaneously giving the court a chance to explain
its reasoning.
A per curiam opinion puts forth the rationale agreed upon by
all three members of a panel of judges.204 Per curiam opinions, if
published, can have the binding force of law and function as
precedent just as authored, published opinions do.205 However, per
curiam opinions may be shorter, and because the opinion is
197. Paul R. Gugliuzza, Rethinking Federal Circuit Jurisdiction, 100 GEO. L.J. 1437, 1464
(2012); see LAWRENCE BAUM, SPECIALIZING THE COURTS 229 (2011).
198. See supra Section III.A.
199. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 835 (2015).
200. See J. Jonas Anderson, Specialized Standards of Review, 18 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 151,
165–87 (2014) (discussing the Federal Circuit’s use of the de novo standard of review).
201. Professor Dennis Crouch recommends an additional fix: require the Federal Circuit to write opinions in all appeals stemming from PTO actions. Crouch, supra note 9, at *26–
27; Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 11, Shore v. Lee, 137 S. Ct. 2197 (2017) (No. 16-1240), 2017
WL 1406097. Given his coverage of this solution, I do not address it here.
202. Michel, supra note 57, at 1201.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 1202.
205. Id.
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unanimous, often less time is taken by individual judges drafting
and editing the opinion. The Federal Circuit rarely uses per curiam
opinions to hand down precedential decisions.206 The court could
reverse this trend and use published per curiam opinions to decide
Rule 36 summary affirmance cases—cases in which the judges
already unanimously agree on the outcome. If the court really is
using summary affirmance as a tool to cert-proof cases, then the per
curiam opinion fix would help resolve the issue because published
per curiam opinions that even tersely declare the law are less likely
to avoid Supreme Court review.
V. CONCLUSION
The Federal Circuit’s decision-making has been under fire since
the court’s inception. Yet little has been written about the court’s
summary affirmance practice. The court has employed Rule 36
more frequently than ever, likely as a result of the court’s increasing
caseload. The passage of the AIA and the creation of new post-grant
proceedings has only added to the court’s burden. While the court’s
use of Rule 36 may be understandable given the number of complex
appeals pending on the docket, the Federal Circuit’s summary
affirmance practice functions as a detriment to the development of
the law. Although it is impossible to understand exactly why the
court is using summary affirmance at such a high rate, the court’s
habit of de novo review, attempts to maintain panel collegiality,
and poor party briefing may be contributing factors. One
additional, plausible theory is that the Federal Circuit occasionally
uses summary affirmance as a tool to cert-proof cases. This
hypothesis is reasonable given the Federal Circuit’s strained
relationship with the Supreme Court, but it almost certainly does
not fully explain the problem. The purpose of this Comment is not
to fully resolve the issues created by the Federal Circuit’s summary
affirmance practice but simply functions to point out the problems
and plausible causes. Future research can postulate a proper
method for fixing these issues.
Andrew Hoffman*
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* J.D., April 2018, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University.
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